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Abstract 
HIV/AIDS is one of the greatest single causes of death and suffering on the planet. Over the last 
decade the societal impact of HIV/AIDS has been widely discussed in terms of national and 
international security.  This article assesses this securitising move. We suggest that HIV/AIDS was at 
best only partially securitised, and that both the political consensus and strength of evidence were 
overestimated. We then present an argument for greater nuance in our understanding both of the 
link between HIV/AIDS and security, and of the effects of its securitisation, suggesting that neither 
are straightforward, and both are subject to case sensitivities. 
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Introduction  
 
Over the course of the past three decades, HIV/AIDS has emerged as one of the greatest single 
causes of death and suffering on the planet. ii The impact of the disease is not only on the lives, 
lifestyles and livelihoods of millions of individuals and their families, but on societies as well. Over 
the last decade in particular the societal impact of HIV/AIDS has been widely discussed in terms of 
national and international security. The key moment in this development was the UN Security 
Council (UNSC)’s meeting in January 2000, and its subsequent passing of Resolution 1308. The 
Security Council’s intervention appeared to act as a catalyst, changing the way in which the disease 
was thought about. It seemed to establish a new consensus over the disease, raising its international 
profile and enhancing the possibilities for action to combat its impact and further spread.  
 
This article is partly a retrospective assessment of this securitising move: ten years after UNSCR 
1308, what has changed? In the first half of the decade there was a widespread assumption, 
reflected in both the International Relations literature and in statements by key policy makers, that 
HIV/AIDS had become well-established as an international security issue. We suggest that in fact the 
strength of the international consensus tended to be overstated; that within a few years the 
consensus over HIV/AIDS as a security issue seemed to have dissipated (not least in the Security 
Council); and that significant doubts had emerged over the evidence for the supposed links between 
HIV and security. In other words, we suggest that the securitising move made by the UNSC in 2000 
was at best only partially successful.  Although there are some examples where HIV/AIDS appears to 
have been framed as a security issue with possible policy implications, in other areas this move 
appears to have limited effect. After examining the manner in which this consensus was made and 
then broken we develop two arguments. First, we suggest that links between HIV/AIDS and security 
do exist, but that they are more complex than was believed ten years ago. The fears articulated 
around the time of the Security Council’s intervention – of militaries and conceivably whole states 
collapsing under the burden of the disease, and of the inexorable spread of HIV in areas of high 
conflict – were overstated, but risks are still present. Second, we examine the consequences of the 
attempt to securitise HIV/AIDS and suggest that although there have been a number of positive 
developments over the last decade many of these cannot be wholly explained by securitisation. Yet, 
at the same time,  the tendency of some actors to treat HIV/AIDS as a security issue has created a 
number of new tensions. 
 
Making a consensus: From Washington to New York  
 
The idea that AIDS poses a potential threat to security has been around for a surprisingly long time. 
As early as 1987 - a time at which only 11 sub-Saharan African states had reported over 100 cases, 
and many of the states which now have the highest prevalence levels had still reported under 100 - a 
US Special National Intelligence Estimate examined the implications of the AIDS pandemic  for the 
region in detail.iii Whilst the report noted that much of the information about the disease’s spread in 
Africa was at that stage ‘anecdotal or based on small medical research programs lacking a strong 
epidemiological basis’iv  there were clear concerns about the strategic and security implications of 
AIDS. Those concerns focussed around two issues. The first was the now-common set of claims 
about the ways in which AIDS threatens the security and stability of states: its disproportionate 
effect on elites; the economic consequences of lost productivity, reduced tourism and long-term 
demographic change; the implications for military capabilities; and the possibility of regional 
tensions being heightened by the reaction of neighbours to a state with high prevalence levels. The 
second issue, now absent from the discourse around AIDS and security but reflective of the very 
different times in which the report was produced, was the effort apparently underway by the Soviet 
Union to use the pandemic to stir up anti-US sentiment in the region by disseminating the idea that 
‘the United States developed and caused the spread of AIDS’ and ‘exploiting black African 
sensitivities to racism and so-called Western imperialism.’v  For both of these reasons, the report 
argued, US interests were at stake. 
 
During the 1990s the AIDS-security linkage began to become more prominent in Washington policy 
circles, although some of those involved in pushing forward the case have complained that the 
Clinton Administration was somewhat slow on the uptake.vi The argument was gaining ground 
nonetheless. A 1992 report published by the Institute of Medicine did much to dramatise the threats 
posed to the US by infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS.vii The same year a Department of State 
memorandum entitled The Global AIDS Disaster: Implications for the 1990s described AIDS as a ‘time 
bomb’ with severe economic, political and military ramifications.viii Two years later Laurie Garrett’s 
influential The Coming Plague put forward similar arguments.ix A June 1996 Presidential Decision 
Directive called for a greater degree of coordination in the US government’s response to the security 
threats posed by infectious diseases. As part of this effort the National Intelligence Council produced 
a National Intelligence Estimate on The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the 
United States (declassified in 2000). Although the report’s scope was wider than HIV and AIDS, that 
was one of its key focuses. Many of the claims which had appeared in the 1987 CIA report were 
repeated, particularly the concerns about the impact on militaries (now seen to include international 
peacekeeping forces), social cohesion and the potential for conflict, and the possibility that ‘disease-
related embargoes and restrictions on travel and immigration will cause frictions among and 
between developed and developing countries’.x  
 
Reflecting these earlier discussions within the US, it was the Clinton Administration who were 
behind the first major push to forward the claim that AIDS is a security threat on the global stage. 
The key moment in this process came in January 2000 when, under the US presidency of the UNSC  
and during a month-long focus on Africa, the Council met to discuss the impact of AIDS on peace and 
security in Africa. Richard Holbrooke, Clinton’s Ambassador to the UN, played the central role in 
getting the issue onto the Council’s agenda. Although he has dated his awareness of the security 
implications of AIDS back to a 1992 trip to Cambodia,xi the immediate precursor to the UNSC’s 
involvement was his visit to southern Africa in December 1999. He then set about persuading key 
figures in the US Administration and in the UN that AIDS should be discussed by the Council. In 
Washington he found a willing supporter in Al Gore, then-Vice President, who personally presided 
over the first Council session on the issue. There was, initially at least, more scepticism within the 
UN. Gwyn Prins quotes Senator Russ Feingold’s recollection of a telephone conversation between 
Holbrooke and Kofi Annan in December 1999. Holbrooke demanded a Security Council session on 
HIV/AIDS. ‘We can’t do that’ the Secretary-General reportedly replied ‘AIDS isn’t a security issue.’xii 
Steve Sternberg, the original source of the story, said that ‘The Security Council meeting, held in 
January 2000, would change that notion forever.’xiii 
 
Certainly Annan’s own view seems to have rapidly changed. On 10 January 2000, less than a month 
after his sceptical telephone conversation with Holbrooke, the Secretary-General told the Security 
Council that ‘it is entirely appropriate that the Council should be devoting its first session [of the new 
millennium] to the problem of AIDS.’xiv Gore was even more clear in signalling the significance of 
what the Council was embarking upon. In his opening address he thanked the members of the 
Council for  
 
their willingness to greet the dawn of this new millennium by exploring 
a brand-new definition of world security. Today marks the first time, 
after more than 4,000 meetings stretching back more than half a 
century, that the Security Council will discuss a health issue as a security 
threat. We tend to think of a threat to security in terms of war and 
peace. Yet no one can doubt that the havoc wreaked and the toll 
exacted by HIV/AIDS do threaten our security.xv 
 
Later in the same discussion Gore argued that  
 
AIDS is not just a humanitarian crisis. It is a security crisis -- because it 
threatens not just individual citizens, but the very institutions that 
define and defend the character of a society. This disease weakens 
workforces and saps economic strength. AIDS strikes at teachers, and 
denies education to their students. It strikes at the military, and 
subverts the forces of order and peacekeeping.xvi 
 
Many of those issues were discussed again later that year when the Security Council passed 
Resolution 1308 focusing on the threat HIV/AIDS posed to international peace and security. The 
Resolution argued that that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, ‘may pose a risk to stability and 
security’, that its spread was ‘exacerbated by conditions of violence and insecurity’ and expressed 
particular concerns over the risks to peacekeepers.xvii The unanimous adoption of Resolution 1308 
seemed to indicate a recognition (at least amongst the fifteen members of the Council) that AIDS 
constituted a security threat. Given the Security Council’s status within the UN, and in world politics 
more broadly, its findings set the agenda for many of the subsequent debates around HIV/AIDS as a 
national security issue. Its actions in 2000 appeared to represent a powerful securitising move, 
framing HIV/AIDS as a threat to national and international security rather than as ‘mere’ 
development or public health problems. In doing so the UNSC could be seen to be acting as a policy 
entrepreneur both within the UN system (for example influencing actions of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations and UNAIDS) and outside (for example the G8).  The Council returned to 
the issue in 2001, 2003 and 2005. In the wider UN context interest in HIV/AIDS as a national security 
problem continued beyond this , with much of the work conducted by UNAIDS and the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations, while in December 2004 infectious disease (including HIV/AIDS) was 
highlighted as a new ‘biosecurity’ threat by the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
established by the Secretary General.xviii  
 
It is possible, then, to interpret the UNSC’s intervention as the critical move in constructing an 
international consensus around HIV/AIDS as a national security problem demanding international 
attention and action. This move rested on a series of arguments which, expressed in various ways, 
became the orthodox set of linkages which scholars and policymakers alike pointed to in arguing for 
attention to be paid to the AIDS-security nexus, specifically: 
 
(i) That uniformed militaries (including peacekeepers) were especially vulnerable to HIV 
and might act as agents in the spread of the disease. This argument was based on some 
empirical evidence, but more importantly on the identification of a range of risk factors 
specific to uniformed militaries.  
 
(ii) That state stability was at risk in high prevalence areas. Economies might be devastated 
by the disease, while the social fabric of a nation could be ripped apart. 
 
(iii) That conflict (including the post-conflict phase) created significant risks for the spread of 
HIV. There was some empirical evidence for this, as well as a range of readily identifiable 
risk factors. 
 
 HIV/AIDS was certainly moving rapidly up the agenda in the early 2000s, and a plethora of new 
policy  initiatives emerged. Within a few months of Resolution 1308 came the adoption of the 
Millennium Development Goals (which explicitly included HIV/AIDS); the General Assembly 
conducted a Special Session on HIV/AIDS in June 2001; in 2002 the G8 established the Global Fund to 
Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; and in 2003 the Bush Administration launched the 
President’s Plan for Emergency AIDS Relief  (PEPFAR), by far the largest national initiative to combat 
the global effects of HIV/AIDS. The disease’s profile was almost unprecedented for a health issue. 
There was a clear and widespread sense of emergency and an almost universally-recognised 
requirement for large-scale and sustained global action. 
 
In this context it was natural that in the first half of the decade the Security Council’s actions, with 
Resolution 1308 serving as the formal expression of its concern, were interpreted by many as a 
scene-changing intervention. Peter Piot, the Executive Director of UNAIDS, saw it as a ‘milestone in 
the response to the epidemic.’xix The AIDS-security linkage was seen in policy statements from major 
western governments and UN agencies; in academic articles, including establishment outlets such as 
International Security and the IISS; and statements and reports from a range of NGOs and civil 
society organisations. Many took the view that this created the potential to gain a much higher 
international profile (and as a consequence greater resources) for the pandemic.xx Others, however,  
highlighted the possible dangers of treating AIDS as a security issue.xxi Either way, all agreed that 
something really significant had happened. 
 
Un-making a consensus: Doubts creep in 
 
A decade on, the robustness of the consensus that HIV/AIDS is a security issue (and that it ought to 
be treated as such) seems somewhat less secure. Firstly, it is now clear that the degree of consensus 
was overstated from the beginning. There were doubts within the Council from the outset over the 
adoption of Resolution 1308, and subsequent actions both within and outside the Council have 
suggested that there is less than universal agreement on HIV/AIDS’ status as a security issue. 
Secondly,  there has been a re-examination of the evidence underpinning the linkages identified 
above. In many cases the evidence has been found wanting, or the connections have turned out to 
be more complex than was originally supposed (an issue which we return to in more detail in the 
following section). This uncertainty has in turn further undermined what agreement there was. 
 
On the face of it, the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1308 would appear to be definitive evidence 
of a consensus (in the Council at least) on the major securitizing claims.  Yet there is ample evidence 
to suggest that the Resolution was a controversial one which the US was required to skilfully steer 
through to adoption. Of the permanent members, Russia, China and France were all initially opposed 
to discussing HIV/AIDS in the Security Council, although they were ultimately persuaded to support 
the Resolution. xxii  Even the UK – the one permanent Council member that publicly backed the 
Resolution – had private qualms. In the final days of negotiation over the wording of the Resolution 
the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was concerned about the danger of exceeding the 
Security Council’s remit. A telegram from the FCO to the Mission in New York on July 13 noted that 
‘[w]e remain concerned that the text as it stands does not obviously fall within the Security Council’s 
competence. [text removed]. …. Nevertheless you should continue to support the US by shortening 
and amending the text.’xxiii A similar message was included in the following day’s telegram.xxiv We 
also know that many of the countries who are the biggest contributors of troops to UN 
peacekeeping operations were opposed to the Resolution. The UK Mission’s report on the July 17 
meeting at which 1308 was adopted notes that ‘Only four non-Council members spoke, perhaps 
reflecting the opposition of many troop contributors to the resolution.’xxv  
 
Despite these doubts Holbrooke was successful in overcoming this opposition. As always the US was 
able to exercise a large degree of influence over the Council.  In this case, however,  it was aided by 
the performance of Dr. Peter Piot, the Director of UNAIDS, who played an important and active role 
in the Council meetings and in the attempts to securitize HIV/AIDS more generally. xxvi  The US effort 
was also helped, no doubt, by HIV/AIDS’ special status as a global issue. Few states would wish to be 
seen to oppose action to combat it. Certainly no state would want to bear the political costs of 
unilaterally blocking international attempts to address the pandemic. The adoption of Resolution 
1308 was not, then, simply the result of a universal agreement on the securitising claims. Even in the 
US case it has become clear that the desire to get AIDS on the Security Council agenda was not solely 
a foreign policy consideration motivated by concerns over international security, but reflected a 
domestic agenda as well. US Vice President Al Gore saw the need to bolster support amongst the US 
HIV/AIDS community prior to the November  Presidential election in which he was the Democratic 
candidate and saw the Security Council’s discussions as a platform for this. Moreover the US Special 
Representative to the UN Richard Holbrooke, who had aspirations to be Gore’s Secretary of State, 
saw this as an opportunity to enhance his own reputation on the international stage.xxvii  
 
In subsequent years, and certainly since 2005, the Security Council seems to have backed away from 
the AIDS issue. Although it was stated following Resolution 1308 that AIDS had become a ‘core issue’ 
for the Security Council,xxviii it now seems to have dropped off the agenda entirely. The pattern 
established by the Council’s 2001, 2003 and 2005 meetings on HIV/AIDS has not continued and there 
has been no formal Council discussion of HIV/AIDS since 2005.  It may be that the Council felt that it 
had already achieved its goal of highlighting the scale of the problem and addressing the specific 
issue relating to UN peacekeeping personnel. Yet the jettisoning of HIV from the Council agenda, 
coupled with a context in which the pandemic in Africa was getting no better,xxix sends out some 
very awkward signals for proponents of the security discourse. Wallensteen and Johansson have 
noted that the Security Council at the turn of the millennium had begun to see ‘security’ in a wider 
context, resulting in ‘thematic Resolutions’ not only on HIV/AIDS but also on other issues such as 
women and children. But, they go on to argue, this virtually disappeared as a result of the increased 
attention on terrorism (and the resulting return to more ‘traditional’ security concerns) which 
followed the events of 11 September 2001.xxx If this is so – and the record of Council resolutions 
post-2001 seems to support the claim – it may be that HIV/AIDS became the subject of a Security 
Council resolution not only due to the agency of Holbrooke and others but also because it happened 
to arise during a window of opportunity. The year 2000 was perhaps uniquely fertile soil for 
attempts to frame AIDS as a security issue.  
 
Away from the Council, the signs of universal agreement on the securitising claims were scarcely 
more convincing. It is certainly the case that the security dimensions of HIV/AIDS have been a 
feature of policy statements from a variety of different sources, including states and multilateral 
bodies such as UNAIDS, the Global Fund and the G8. Yet it is questionable how many governments 
and agencies actually see and respond to the pandemic primarily in security terms. As we argue in 
the final section of this article below, security seems to have been only one of the motivations for 
the proliferation of global initiatives to tackle the AIDS problem. In many ways it appears to be less 
significant than others, perhaps most notably international development.  Comparisons of the 
approaches taken by the US (the prime instigator of securitisation) and other states certainly suggest 
that security is not in all cases the dominant frame. xxxi  
 
The fragile agreement over HIV/AIDS as a security issue was further undermined by a second set of 
developments, namely concerns over the empirical evidence supporting the claims. As seen above, 
HIV/AIDS was first identified as a security threat by the policy community, in particular by 
intelligence agencies such as the CIA. In some cases, most notably the 1987 CIA report, the evidence 
on which the purported links were based was recognised by the authors themselves as being 
incomplete. By the middle of the decade which had begun with the high points of a Security Council 
discussion and Resolution 1308, doubts were beginning to be expressed in the academic community, 
not least by Tony Barnett of the LSE and Alex de Waal of Harvard, over the evidence supporting 
these claims. In an influential 2005 report to UNAIDS, circulated to members of the Security Council, 
Barnett with Gwyn Prins argued that: ‘Since the passage of Resolution 1308, year-on-year there has 
been an increasing flow of publication [sic] on the subject of AIDS and security... this is largely a 
literature of “inverted triangles”... balanced on narrow footings in terms of high quality hard 
evidence.’xxxii  For Barnett and Prins however, it was not simply the thin basis of evidence available, 
but the nature of that evidence and the way it had been used which was problematic. In particular 
they criticised the widespread use of ‘factoids’ in the literature on HIV and security: ‘“Factoids” are 
the intellectual viruses of quick and dirty synthetic studies. They are soft opinions that have 
hardened into “fact”. The term describes pieces of data that look credible at first glance but which 
are insecurely grounded in evidence. They achieve this status as a result of a form of pyramid selling 
by recycling through publications, grey literature and reports of meetings.’xxxiii It may well be that the 
Barnett and Prins report bolstered the resolve of those who were opposed to it being on the Council 
agenda in the first place, but at the very least it posed awkward questions over the strength of the 
case made.  Barnett’s work  then focussed on the issue of HIV and state fragility. In a series of papers 
in the second half of the decade he developed a powerful critique of the link, suggesting that there 
was no direct relationship between high levels of HIV and state fragility.xxxiv Meanwhile, in 2005 Alex 
de Waal presented a paper on ‘HIV/AIDS and the military’ to a seminar organised by the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague. In this he argued that the 
‘received wisdom’ concerning high HIV levels in the military required greater scrutiny.xxxv De Waal’s 
scepticism was developed more fully the next year in an article with Alan Whiteside and Tsadkan 
Gebre-Tensae. Their conclusion was that ‘the oft-cited claim that soldiers have prevalence rates two 
to five times higher than the civilian population is unsustainable and should no longer be cited ... 
[and] there is remarkably little good evidence for conflict accelerating the spread of HIV/AIDS’.xxxvi In 
the AIDS and security field, however, De Waal is perhaps best known for his leading role in the AIDS, 
Security and Conflict Initiative (ASCI).xxxvii As lead author of its concluding 2009 report, de Waal 
brings together a wide range of field work, new data and reports commissioned by ASCI to critique 
the generalised assumptions of the early years of the decade: 
 
[T]he agenda has moved from the general to the specific... earlier more 
alarmist relationships that were assumed to exist between national-level state 
security and HIV and AIDS are not borne out by the evidence.xxxviii  
 
De Waal is careful not to dismiss the link entirely however, instead arguing for an ‘intermediary 
[level of analysis] between macro-level assumptions and micro-level behavioural and biomedical 
approaches’.xxxix   Local government structures, which are often primarily responsible for directly 
delivering services to the population, may be more immediately affected by HIV/AIDS than national 
governments. Work on the case of South Africa, for example, has suggested that the ‘hollowing out’ 
of government capacity is starting to be felt in local municipalities.xl Yet this insight has not to date 
been widely reflected in the debates over the securitisation of AIDS in either the policy or academic 
communities, both of which have tended to focus on national governments as crucial to the stability 
of states.   
 
It is clear that the second half of the decade was marked by much more uncertainty over HIV/AIDS 
as a security issue. The apparent consensus over many of the claims which underpinned 
securitisation has come under strain both in academia and the policy world. What was originally 
seen as the securitisation of HIV/AIDS now appears more as a securitising move which has been at 
best only partially successful. 
  
Building a New Consensus: Recognising complexity 
 
What we suggest here however is that the picture emerging is not one of there being no link 
between HIV/AIDS and security, but rather that we require a more nuanced understanding of this 
link. Moreover we argue that the initial fears expressed over the security consequences of high HIV 
prevalence rates were overstated and not applicable in all circumstances. Again, what is needed is a 
better understanding, this time of the circumstances under which HIV can impact on national 
security. One of the most important reasons why the relationship between HIV and security is 
difficult to understand is that it is marked by complexity. This should have come as no surprise, since 
HIV is not one but many epidemics, its impacts manifesting in a diverse number of ways across 
different cultures and societies.xli Whereas much of the literature on HIV and security in the early 
part of the decade portrayed the epidemic as one event encompassed by a single, grand narrative, 
the reality appears considerably more diverse both with regard to the nature of the epidemic and, 
more especially, to its social consequences. It is only more recently that the complexity in the 
relationship between HIV and security has been addressed. To illustrate this we re-examine the 
three key linkages raised earlier in this article as central to linking HIV and security: prevalence rates 
in the uniformed services (including peacekeepers); the impact of high prevalence rates on state 
stability; and the link between conflict and the spread of HIV.  
 
(i) Prevalence rates in armed services 
At the time of UN Security Council Resolution 1308 in 2000, it was accepted wisdom that militaries in 
sub-Saharan Africa were subject to between two and five times the HIV prevalence rate of civilian 
populations, and that this impacted (or had the potential to impact) upon their operational capacity, 
thereby making it a national security issue.xlii In 2005 however, UNAIDS admitted that ‘little reliable 
information is available on levels of HIV infection among uniformed services. Few countries conduct 
systematic screening and public health surveillance systems are often weak’.xliii Nevertheless, in 
2006, UNAIDS again repeated its belief that militaries ‘are at risk of contracting HIV, and that AIDS 
impacts on their effectiveness’.xliv The claim that ‘[a]mong male population groups, military and 
police report the highest risk behaviour and number of partners’ and that this ‘can seriously affect 
military readiness’ remains present on its website to this day.xlv 
 
Serious questions have been asked over the origins and generality of this assertion. The widely cited 
figure of two to five times higher prevalence appears to have originated in a single study from the 
early 1990s. As Whiteside and colleagues argue, ‘While there was some evidence for this (with 
respect to HIV) in the early 1990s… it was uncritically accepted and repeated and is in fact 
demonstrably incorrect today [2006].’xlvi Although there are reasons why prevalence rates in armed 
forces might be higher than the civilian population, equally there were interventions available to the 
military which could reduce risk by raising awareness.xlvii Depending on the success of these 
interventions, prevalence rates might vary considerably. Nor is a straightforward comparison 
between the adult civilian population and the armed forces satisfactory –age profile, location and 
socio-economic status are all potentially significant variables in terms of risk of infection. Militaries 
are generally not representative of the general population by any of these measures.xlviii  Crucially 
however, prevalence in the armed forces appears now to depend on a variety of factors including 
demography, structure, recruitment patterns, military ethos and training, delivery of awareness 
programmes and access to condoms, alcohol and drug abuse, and the stage and nature of the 
epidemic.xlix  
 
Moreover even if the armed forces had a higher HIV prevalence, the impact upon operational 
effectiveness would vary depending on factors such as the availability of replacements, discipline, 
and the significance of other security forces to a given emergency (including police and private 
security companies). Nor is it apparent that the weakness of a state’s armed forces is a causal agent 
in either internal or external aggression. It appears far more likely to be a contributory factor, and 
even then secrecy over combat readiness and HIV prevalence may limit the impression of weakness.l 
What this therefore suggests is that uniformed services (including peacekeepers) may be at greater 
risk under certain circumstances, and that high prevalence in the security forces may contribute to 
national security problems; but both are dependent on a wide range of variables rather than the 
simple causal relationship suggested at the beginning of the decade. 
  
 
(ii) HIV and state stability 
In his address to the UNSC’s January 2000 session on HIV/AIDS, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
argued that ‘AIDS is causing socio-economic crises which in turn threaten political stability.’li The 
effects of the disease on economies and on governance were frequently highlighted by the UN and 
other commentators as potentially destabilising. For these commentators, economic decline due to 
high HIV prevalence may increase income inequalities and poverty, exacerbating or creating social 
and political unrest. Equally worrying was the unusually high prevalence of HIV amongst skilled 
professionals, including civil servants, teachers, police and health workers, which may threaten the 
institutions that make a state run effectively.lii   
 Although it was perhaps understandable that a link be drawn between high prevalence and state 
instability in the early years of the decade – after all, state failure had been an international zeitgeist 
of the 1990s, and a set of risk factors were clearly identifiable – this link was clearly speculative since 
there had at that time been no example of a state failing due to high HIV prevalence. Nor has there 
ten years on. Indeed, there is a noticeable lack of a correlation between those states with the 
highest levels of HIV in Africa, and those which are most fragile.liii Although Laurie Garrett has 
pointed out that the extended event horizon of the disease means that the full social and economic 
impact may be seen in decades not months or years,liv with the epidemic well into its third decade in 
Africa there seems to be little sign yet of states failing because of HIV. One of the major findings of 
the ASCI project was that there was no direct causal linkage between HIV and state fragility. Indeed, 
it was argued that the use of the concept of ‘state fragility’ may actually undermine the effectiveness 
of international responses: ‘fragile states’ are not all fragile in the same way, or for the same 
reasons. Attempts to address HIV/AIDS must therefore recognise this diversity.lv 
 
Yet clearly high HIV prevalence creates the potential for negative economic and social impacts in 
some of the weakest states on earth. How then can we explain the apparent absence of a link 
between HIV and state failure? UNAIDS have suggested that the link is indirect, combining with or 
exacerbating other factors more obviously associated with state instability,lvi while in their Jaipur 
paradigm Barnett and Whiteside offer a more subtle understanding of the link suggesting that it is 
only if such states also have both low social cohesion and high levels of poverty/unequal distribution 
of wealth that they may be at high risk of instability.lvii Other factors may also explain the poor 
correlation. These include the ability of states or the international community to respond, not least 
through aid or the provision of anti-retroviral therapies (ARTS); that the effect of HIV may be felt at 
the local or community level, but failure at this level is not usually considered in measures of state 
stability; that unpaid labour costs (especially women and children) tend not to be included in macro-
economic analyses of state performance; and that state failure indices focus on short to medium 
term changes, not long term ones.lviii In 2006 Whiteside et al concluded 
 
The HIV/AIDS epidemic erodes institutional capacity, creates poverty and 
despair and intensifies dependence on international aid. These are all serious 
pressures which jeopardize the development of sound democratic governance 
and can intensify crisis.lix 
 
What has become apparent is that we do not fully understand whether and how this can lead to 
state failure. 
 
 
(iii) Conflict and the spread of HIVlx 
As Stefan Elbe wrote in 2002, ‘armed conflicts and their participants constitute an important vector 
of HIV/AIDS, a virus responsible for killing more than ten times as many people in Africa as the 
conflicts themselves.’lxi Similarly a US Institute for Peace report baldly stated that ‘no one denies the 
role of conflict in the spread of the virus’.lxii Perhaps most significant however was the endorsement 
of the UN and especially the Security Council. In the preamble to Resolution 1308, the Security 
Council argued that the spread of HIV was ‘exacerbated by conditions of violence and insecurity’.lxiii 
Evidence for this link originated from several years earlier. In particular the first major epidemic of 
HIV and AIDS, in Uganda, coincided with the invasion of that country.lxiv Moreover more general 
conclusions were drawn from sub-Saharan Africa being an area of high instability and conflict during 
the 1970s and 1980s when HIV began to spread.lxv Reasons offered for this link included: high HIV 
prevalence amongst uniformed services which come into greater contact with civilian populations 
during conflict; human migration to avoid conflict and their return post-conflict; changes in sexual 
behaviour, especially increased sexual violence towards women; the impact of conflict upon health 
provision; and risks which emerge post-conflict, especially with regard to peacekeepers and human 
mobility. lxvi 
 
By the middle years of this decade however, further research suggested that the links were more 
complex than first imagined.lxvii Some long conflicts demonstrated little change in HIV prevalence, 
while others saw prevalence actually reduce, suggesting that conflict might in some circumstances 
act as a ‘brake’ on the spread of the disease. Not least, if conflict isolated a region and reduced the 
ability of people to move freely, then one of the most significant vectors for the spread of the 
disease – human mobility – is directly affected. The case of Angola appeared particularly interesting 
in this respect. UNAIDS commented that ‘largely due to the internal armed conflict, the Angolan HIV 
prevalence appears considerably lower than in neighbouring countries. This suggests that the 
restricted mobility as a result of the conflict may have slowed the spread of HIV in the country.’lxviii 
Similarly in Burundi, prevalence rates actually fell in the capital during the period of conflict.lxix 
Initially such cases could be presented as exceptions, but as more evidence emerged of lower HIV 
rates in conflicts, so the picture became even less clear.lxx In a major article in 2007, Paul Spiegel ( 
the senior HIV officer at UNHCR) and colleagues argued that  
 
there is insufficient evidence that HIV transmission increases in populations 
affected by conflict. Furthermore, there are insufficient data to conclude 
that refugees fleeing conflict have a higher prevalence of HIV infection than 
do their surrounding host communities... past assumptions that conflict 
and displacement increase prevalence of HIV infection were made from a 
few surveys, some of questionable quality and others with biased 
interpretation of resultslxxi  
 
Nevertheless even Spiegel et al were unwilling to deny a possible link between conflict and HIV: 
‘Displaced populations and those affected by conflict are clearly at risk of HIV transmission. 
Furthermore, to expect that incidence of HIV infection will be high in survivors of conflict and rape is 
understandable’.lxxii The work of Spiegel and others suggested that the link between conflict and the 
spread of HIV was not straightforward.lxxiii In particular, the reasons commonly offered for this link 
had begun to appear rather more nuanced and subject to variables than was originally believed,lxxiv 
while the empirical evidence was highly varied – in some conflicts prevalence increased, but in 
others it remained the same or even dropped.  Conflict did not automatically lead to increased 
prevalence but rather presented as a risk factor for the spread of HIV. The relationship was not 
straightforward but complex, and what was lacking was an explanation of when and how this risk 
factor translated into increased HIV prevalence. Just as HIV epidemics vary between different 
countries, so do conflicts. The extent to which conflict is a vector for HIV depends on the specificities 
of both the conflict and the epidemic in that state. This level of nuance was missing from the claims 
that were being made 10 years ago, and was missing from Resolution 1308. 
 
 
The Mixed Effects of Securitising HIV/AIDS 
 
If the above suggests that the relationship between HV/AIDS and national security is more complex 
than originally suspected, this section examines the effect of the (partial) securitisation on policy 
responses and discusses how securitising HIV/AIDS may create new tensions. The desire to affect 
policy responses was central to the securitising move: presenting HIV as a security issue was not 
simply a recognition of the dangers the epidemic posed for societies. It was also a deliberate 
attempt to change the way in which the disease was thought about, leading to different possibilities 
for action.  Gwyn Prins for example has argued that the prime mover behind the Security Council’s 
discussion of HIV in January 2000, the US Permanent Representative Richard Holbrooke, was 
motivated by a realisation that traditional approaches to disease rooted in medical and development 
paradigms were not working.  By reframing HIV as a security issue, Holbrooke hoped to gain greater 
political attention and resources to combat the disease. Holbrooke was not alone at the time in 
seeing advantages in linking health to foreign and security policy.lxxv  
 
Yet the benefits of securitising health in general and HIV in particular now appear more complex and 
nuanced, and a number of potential downsides have been highlighted.lxxvi Securitising HIV creates 
three particular areas of tension. The first concerns ethics and the extent to which the rights of the 
individual should be maintained over the rights and interests of society.  Securitising HIV does 
something special here. In making HIV a security issue, a claim is being made that it is outside the 
realm of normal politics; and that as an extreme event it warrants extreme response measures, such 
as the suspension of certain civil liberties.lxxvii So the tension created is whether the costs in terms of 
suspending rights are worth the benefits in terms of the public good; and the sharp point is over 
issues such as the mandatory testing of security forces for HIV. Second, securitising HIV may help to 
secure greater attention and resources,  but the problem is whether in so doing it changes the 
priorities for resource allocation, away from those in need and towards political benefits. Third, 
considerable progress has been made in terms of how HIV and AIDS are perceived, and in particular 
with regard to the stigmatisation of people living with HIV or AIDS. Securitising HIV however might 
run the risk of creating a new form of stigma, namely that those living with the disease are not only 
health risks but security risks as well. In considering the extent to which security-based logics have 
come to underpin national and international responses to HIV/AIDS, it is important to be vigilant for 
signs that these potential problems are becoming apparent.lxxviii 
 
However, any assessment of the extent to which claims about the extent to which links between HIV 
and security have influenced this is hampered by the problem of evidencing causation: what is being 
asked is not what has changed, but what has changed because of securitisation as opposed to other 
possible causes. Given the difficulties in evidencing the independent effects of securitization, 
assessments of the security frame’s contribution to global responses to HIV and AIDS are necessarily 
somewhat impressionistic. Nevertheless, here we briefly examine the impact which the AIDS-
security linkage has had on national and global responses, and highlight some of the areas in which 
tensions have arisen. 
 
As it has been shown above, it was within US intelligence and security communities that the impetus 
to securitise AIDS first developed. It is no surprise therefore to find that it is within the US that 
security-based thinking has had the greatest policy purchase. A number of scholars have examined 
exactly how securitization has affected US policy approaches to HIV/AIDS and have argued that 
security concerns have been represented in PEPFAR, the centrepiece of US efforts to address 
AIDS.lxxix Alan Ingram has described how the National Intelligence Council’s concerns about the 
impact of AIDS in ‘next-wave’ states combined with a number of other factors (including criticisms of 
the US’ lack of action on international development and lobbying by evangelical Christian groups and 
black congressional groups) to motivate President Bush’s launching of PEPFAR.lxxx A Council on 
Foreign Relations report argued that the linking of AIDS and security was crucial in building 
bipartisan support in Congress for PEPFAR, a foreign aid package of unprecedented size.lxxxi Indeed 
the perceived benefits to US strategic interests are behind at least some of the backing PEPFAR 
continues to receive in Congress. During the Senate’s debate on the reauthorisation of PEPFAR in 
2008 Senator Richard Lugar stated that 
 
We should understand that our investments in disease prevention programs 
have yielded enormous foreign policy benefits during the last five years. 
PEPFAR has helped to prevent instability and societal collapse in a number of 
at-risk countries; it has stimulated contributions from other wealthy nations 
to fight AIDS; it has facilitated deep partnerships with a new generation of 
African leaders; and it has improved attitudes toward the United States in 
Africa and other regions. In my judgment, the dollars spent on this program 
can be justified purely on the basis of the humanitarian results that we have 
achieved. But the value of this investment clearly extends to our national 
security and to our national reputation.lxxxii 
 
There is evidence, however, that securitisation has not only bolstered overall support for PEPFAR, 
but that it has also affected the way in which money is spent. Ingram notes in his examination of 
PEPFAR in Nigeria that the Department of Defense plays a major implementation role through its 
work in support of the Nigerian military. For Ingram, this is an example of a broader trend in US 
policy in which militaries have come to be  seen as ‘strategic points at which to intervene against the 
pandemic while promoting security interests across the spectrum of national, international, global 
and human concerns.’lxxxiii This is clearly reflected in the justification of Department of Defense’s 
HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) which involves collaborating with other countries to combat 
HIV/AIDS amongst their militaries on the basis that doing so ‘has clear ties to security interests, 
regional stability, humanitarian concerns, and peacekeeping efforts’.lxxxiv 
 The involvement of the US military in efforts to combat HIV/AIDS has not been limited to its work 
with other national militaries. It has also brought potentially significant advances in other (perhaps 
less obvious) ways, and in some cases these may bring wider benefits. One example is vaccine 
research under the Department of Defense’s US Military HIV Research Program.lxxxv This captured 
global media attention when, in September 2009, results of a US Army backed (but Thailand-based) 
clinical trial of a prime-boost HIV vaccine regimen were releasedlxxxvi which suggested that the tested 
regimen was ‘modestly effective at reducing the rate of HIV infection.’lxxxvii The US Army Surgeon-
General’s statement on the trial was striking, and highlighted some of the tensions which can arise 
when AIDS policy is linked to security policy. He said that 
 
The Army will continue to be an aggressive sponsor and is committed to 
developing a globally effective HIV vaccine to protect US and allied troops 
from infection and to support the US National Security Strategy by reducing 
the global impact of the disease.lxxxviii 
 
Others have found that the targeting of US policy has been affected by geopolitical concerns in other 
ways. Denis Altman has explained Vietnam’s inclusion as a PEPFAR ‘Focus country’ as ‘part of a 
larger American détente with a former enemy’.lxxxix Whilst in some ways distinct from a direct 
concern with national security, this example does suggest that wider foreign policy interests at least 
play a part in determining where PEPFAR money is spent.  
 
In the US, then, where over the last two decades HIV/AIDS has become deeply embedded as a 
security issue there is evidence of securitisation having a genuine impact on policy. The key security 
institutions (the Department of Defense, the CIA, the National Intelligence Council and so on) 
recognise AIDS as being within their remit, and are taking steps to address it. Yet there has been 
little work which has demonstrated a comparable impact on the policies adopted by other countries, 
nor do the security policy institutions in other countries appear to have seized on the issue to the 
same extent. In the UK case, for example, addressing the global problem of HIV/AIDS falls clearly 
within the mandate of the Department for International Development (DFID) rather than the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office or the Ministry of Defence. Indeed, the UK has created ‘institutional and 
legal firewalls’ to prevent security policy concerns from affecting DFID’s work.xc 
 
What about those countries who find their own security potentially at risk as a result of high HIV 
prevalence levels? In some cases, as we have seen, states have implemented programmes (often 
with US Department of Defense support) to limit the impact of HIV/AIDS on their militaries. But 
states have not always taken the decisive action which might be expected of them: even some states 
which have a prima facie reason to be concerned about the security implications of HIV/AIDS have 
not made concerted efforts to address it. This includes some of the so-called ‘next wave’ states such 
as Russia and China which have been of considerable concern to the US security community.xci 
Feshbach has argued in the case of Russia that HIV/AIDS is having some impact on the state, in 
particular its military forces, albeit as only as a contributory factor alongside larger problems of 
demographic trends and generally poor population health. The Russian military, he claims, rejects 
around 30% of potential conscripts on medical grounds each year. Whilst HIV ranks relatively lowly 
as a cause of rejection, dwarfed by ‘mental disorders’ and drug addiction, the figures suggest that it 
is a growing problem, and is also linked to high levels of Tuberculosis in the military.xcii However, 
whilst Feshbach’s report suggests that the Russian state is (belatedly) beginning to recognise these 
problems as potential challenges to its future securityxciii action to address the problem (for example 
through the provision of ARTs) is still at an early stage of development. In short, the picture 
Feshbach presents is of a state which has begun to think about the problems poor health (of which 
HIV is one part) is posing to its security, but has not yet developed a sufficient sense of emergency to 
devote serious resources to combating it. 
 
Global-level responses to HIV/AIDS have developed hugely in the last decade. The profile of the 
disease has increased markedly, as the proponents of securitisation hoped. In key bodies such as the 
UN and the G8 HIV (and Africa more generally) has become an important focus for political 
attention. HIV is sometimes referred to in these settings in security language, indicating that it is no 
longer solely seen only as a humanitarian or development issue and suggesting that securitisation 
has done at least some of the work in raising the political profile of the disease. In line with this 
increased profile, global spending to address HIV/AIDS has risen exponentially since 2000. According 
to UNAIDS, global financing for AIDS has increased more than ten-fold from 2000 to approximately 
US$13.8 billion in 2008.xciv Access to treatment has improved in the developing world, and the 
WHO’s goal of 3 million people accessing antiretroviral therapy has finally been met (albeit not by 
the target date of 2005). In 2008 UNAIDS reported the first decline in AIDS deaths since the virus was 
first identified in the 1980s.xcv  
 
Despite this, it seems fair to conclude that the security-framing has only played a genuinely 
significant role in certain areas. Many of the most important global developments (including the 
Millennium Development Goals, the 2001 Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS and the creation 
of the Global Fund)  have not rested primarily on security considerations. Indeed one of the ironies 
of the attempts by Holbrooke and others to show that HIV is not ‘merely’ a development problem is 
that it coincided with a resurgence in efforts to promote international development, expressed most 
concretely through the MDGs. Whilst it seems probable that the MDG targets will not be met by 
2015, development itself has become a major focus of political attention, and a major motivator of 
international action. Closely related to this, there have been a number of international attempts to 
address the problems facing Africa as a continent, seen most clearly in set-piece events including the 
UNSC’s month on Africa, during which HIV/AIDS was first discussed, and the Gleneagles G8 summit. 
HIV/AIDS has fed into both of these (linked) foci of attention. The lesson of the last decade may be 
that securitisation is not the only way of getting attention: ‘developmentisation’ may work too.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The deliberations of the UNSC in January 2000, followed by Resolution 1308 later that year, seemed 
to mark a change in the way in which HIV/AIDS was framed. Although the security risks of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic had been previously identified, not least in the US, the actions of the Security 
Council appeared to mark the successful securitisation of the disease – that it was now recognised as 
a security risk of such national and international concern that it should be viewed differently from 
other emergencies and was worthy of exceptional actions.  In this article however we have argued 
that this overestimated the political consensus behind the UNSC’s actions, and suffered at the hands 
of critics in the middle and later years of the decade who outlined the lack of evidence for the 
assertions made.  Thus by the middle years of the decade, the securitisation of HIV/AIDS looked 
fragile, lacking both political support and a strong evidentiary base. This does not however mean 
either that there is no link between HIV/AIDS and security, nor that the securitising move failed.   
 
On the first of these points, it has become apparent that the links between HIV/AIDS and security 
are far from straightforward and greater nuance is required. Case sensitivities and intervening 
variables litter current understandings of the link. This demonstrates a much greater sophistication 
than was apparent a decade ago, and is also cause for some optimism over the societal effects of the 
disease – states are less likely to collapse because of the burden of HIV/AIDS, uniformed militaries 
and other security forces have less to fear from it in terms of their operational capabilities, and 
conflict does not automatically lead to the further spread of the disease. Some of the more dire 
predictions which were commonplace at the beginning of the last decade now appear overly 
alarmist. Nevertheless, the disease continues to spread with millions of new infections each year, 
and large areas of uncertainty persist over the long term consequences of this. 
 
On the latter point, the HIV/AIDS case highlights the fact that securitisation is not a binary condition 
– there is a spectrum from failed, to partial to successful securitisation processes.xcvi  Neither are the 
results of a securitising move homogenous. Rather some actors have accepted HIV/AIDS’ status as a 
security issue more readily than others. This variety may in part be a reflection of the disease itself, 
that its effects are not homogenous but diverse depending on context; but it also suggests that 
different actors (often at the level of ministries or even individuals) were more easily persuaded 
than others.  
 
What then has been the effect of this partial securitisation? Some actions aimed at groups at risk 
have reflected security concerns. Considerable work has been done for example to educate 
militaries, including UN peacekeepers and disaster relief workers, on preventing HIV, much of which 
can be traced back directly to the (partial) securitisation of HIV. Nevertheless the overall impression 
of the impact of securitisation is one of disappointment. Despite the hopes expressed by many a 
decade ago, securitisation has not changed the course of the pandemic. Where it has had an effect it 
has mainly either been at the margins (eg educating the military) or a contributory factor in wider 
developments (such as PEPFAR). Indeed HIV seems to some extent to have lost ground on the 
security agenda to other health issues.  Pandemic influenza has become a more pressing concern for 
developed Western governments who find their own populations at risk from its uncontrollable 
cross-border spread. The threat of bioterrorism continues to worry the security community, and is a 
focus for major investment. The US has apparently spent between US$50 billion and US$60 billion 
on its biodefence programme since 9/11,  more than the US$48 billion authorised for PEPFAR for the 
five years from FY 2009 to FY 2013 (and considerably more than the US$15 billion spent between FY 
2004 and FY 2008). In a world where myriad health and non-health issues are competing for political 
priority AIDS' current high profile cannot be taken for granted. Securitisation may or may not be the 
most effective way of capturing the attention of policymakers, but the human and social costs of the 
disease mean that there is a clear need to keep AIDS firmly on the radar. 
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